Magyar accepts the cultural framework of traditional Hungary—family, faith, flag—but insists that these values can only thrive under liberal institutions and rehabilitation of public service, writes Sari Hanafi. [GETTY]
For sixteen years, Viktor Orbán did not merely govern Hungary; he redefined it. His doctrine of the “illiberal state” was a key feature of his rule. He argued that liberal democracy—with its checks and balances, its independent press, its rights for minorities—was a Western toxin. In its place, he built a nationalistic, legalistic autocracy where the constitution was a plaything and the judiciary a branch of the ruling party.
On April 12, that experiment died.
Peter Magyar’s landslide victory has meant both a change of government and a system transition. But to understand what Hungary is becoming, we must first understand what it is leaving behind.
Under Orbán, Hungary held elections, it had a parliament, a prime minister, and a constitutional court. By the thinnest procedural definition, it was a democracy. But in substance, it was a captured state. Orbán perfected the art of the legal coup. He did not ban the opposition; he suffocated it. When it came to newspapers, he allowed his oligarchs to buy them all, turning the media into a propaganda monolith. With the judiciary, he raised judges’ retirement age overnight, replacing them with loyalists, and neutered the Constitutional Court.
The 2011 Fundamental Law enshrined Orbán’s vision of “historical constitution” while eliminating judicial review of constitutional amendments. The result was a democracy with democratic forms but illiberal substance: elections free but not fair, rights written but not enforced.
The alternative
Magyar, on the other hand, is not a revolutionary leftist. He does not fly the rainbow flag, nor does he chant Marxist slogans. He is a conservative: flag-waving, family-valuing, Catholic. But his conservatism is of a different pedigree—one that pre-dates Orbán’s illiberal turn.
This is liberal conservatism in the classical European sense, the belief that a stable society requires the rule of law, independent courts, a free press, and property rights protected equally for all citizens, regardless of their loyalty to the ruling party. He also believes in combating inequality, promoting public services and economic redistribution.
Magyar’s platform, released in late 2025, was remarkable not for its radicalism but for its restorationism. He promised judicial independence, scrapping the National Judicial Office controlled by Fidesz, reinstating mandatory retirement ages, and depoliticising the Constitutional Court. He also pledged to deliver media pluralism, breaking up the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA)—the Orbán family media monopoly—and auctioning its outlets to independent owners.
Anti-corruption statutes, which would require creating a fully independent prosecutor’s office, with EU oversight, to recover assets stolen by Orbán’s network, as well as term limits for prime ministers, are also amongst the list of promises.
All that is very important for social justice, something that was downplayed by symbolic liberals.
The role of identity politics is even more marginal in Magyar’s discourse. Under Orbán, Hungary has become a key site of “culture war politics,” with strong emphasis on anti-migration policies and the defence of a particular vision of national identity. None of this is “woke.” None of this is socialism. It is the basic furniture of a functioning liberal democracy. And yet, after sixteen years of Orbán, it feels revolutionary.
Indeed, Magyar’s strategy has been to shift the focus away from identity and toward governance.
Social justice
If you followed the Western media narratives entering 2026, you might have expected the election to hinge on the so-called “LGBTQ propaganda” law or the rights of asylum seekers. The European Union has certainly frozen billions in funds over these very issues. However, for the majority of Hungarians who voted for change, social justice was the destination. In an illiberal system, the primary political axis is not left versus right. It is liberal versus illiberal—that is, rule of law versus rule of men.
Orbán’s regime did not fail because it was too conservative. It failed because it was too corrupt, too arbitrary, too lawless.
Magyar understood this, which is why he campaigned against Orbán’s impunity. When Orbán claimed that Hungary was a “Christian nation,” Magyar would reply: Then let us act like one. Christ said ‘Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s.’ You have rendered the nation’s wealth to your family.
On social issues, Magyar has signalled a live-and-let-live approach. He will not repeal Orbán’s ban on same-sex adoption—he knows his rural base would revolt—but he has quietly instructed state agencies to stop enforcing discrimination against LGBTQ families in practice.
When asked about Pride marches, he said: “The police protect all peaceful assemblies. That is the law. I follow the law.” When he was asked if he wanted to join the planned Pride marches, he politely replied I am busy identifying sites of Orban’s corruption.
He knows that most of his voters, while sick of Orban, remain socially conservative. He is offering them economic security and democratic normalcy in exchange for tolerance.
This is the genius of the liberal-conservative synthesis. Magyar accepts the cultural framework of traditional Hungary—family, faith, flag—but insists that these values can only thrive under liberal institutions and rehabilitation of public service (particularly healthcare and schools).
A conservative society requires an impartial state. Without it, conservatism degenerates into cronyism.
However, social justice, alas, is not for everyone. In European democracies, the continued disregard for the rights of colonised peoples will most likely persist under Magyar’s influence. The news is alarming, offering a big carrot to Israel by declaring that Hungary’s veto against European sanctions will remain, and that the country will continue its close relationship with them. This is despite the small threat that Hungary would have to arrest Netanyahu if he visits.
The position of Magyar suggests a nationalist turn in Hungarian politics—one that prioritises strategic alliances with powerful nations like Israel over solidarity with marginalised communities, both at home and abroad.
The Hungarian lesson
It is the victory of the pragmatic centre. In an era of populist extremes—Trumpian MAGA on one side and symbolic liberals on the other—Magyar has carved a path that is radical only in its moderation. He is a conservative who wants to be friends with the EU. A nationalist who wants to root out corruption, not immigrants. A religious man who tolerates secularism. A democrat who wields a supermajority but promises not to abuse it.
Europe has spent a decade terrified of democratic backsliding. Hungary was the warning sign. But Hungary can also serve as a proof of concept for democratic restoration.
Peter Magyar won by offering a return to the basic bargain of liberal democracy, with emphasis on social justice through rehabilitation of the public service, that the state serves the citizen, not the party; that the law applies to the powerful as well as the weak; that an election means something.
Sari Hanafi is Professor of Sociology, Director of the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies and Chair of the Islamic Studies program at the American University of Beirut. He was the President of the International Sociological Association (2018-23). He was also the editor of Idafat: the Arab Journal of Sociology (Arabic) (2017-2022), and author of Studying Islam in the Arab World (2023).
Follow Sari on X: @hanafi1962
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