Fertiliser disruption exposes a blind spot that farm-level policy has long ignored – but Africa holds the resources to fix it.
Africa’s next food crisis may not begin on the farm, but in a distant shipping lane. With the Iran war, international attention has focused on oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz and related shortages or price spikes in energy and fuel. Less visible is another vulnerability moving through the same corridor: the fertilisers underpinning global food production.
Production capacity exists in parts of North and West Africa, driven by massive phosphate deposits and natural gas reserves. Morocco leads in phosphates, accounting for over 50 per cent of Africa’s supply and ranks among the top five global phosphate fertiliser exporters, while Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria dominate in nitrogenous (urea) fertiliser production.
A significant share of global fertiliser output is tied to energy-rich regions, particularly in the Gulf. The Middle East is a major hub for nitrogen-based fertilisers, reflecting the local availability of natural gas, which underpins ammonia and urea production.
The Strait of Hormuz connects these production hubs to global markets through a single, highly exposed shipping route. Almost 50 per cent of the globally traded sulphur used in phosphate fertilisers moves through it, making it a critical corridor for global agricultural inputs.
In parts of the Gulf, fertiliser plants have reduced output or paused operations. Even major producers like Morocco’s OCP Group are affected.
Fertiliser production relies on critical inputs like sulphur, much of which is sourced from the Persian Gulf, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, regions entangled in these disrupted trade routes. As sulphur supply tightens, production cannot be scaled up, even where phosphate reserves are abundant, and domestic logistics remain intact.
Constrained production will also erode export revenues for Africa’s major fertiliser exporters. Morocco and Egypt, together accounting for roughly 70 per cent of the continent’s fertiliser exports, could be disproportionately affected. At the same time, net importers, like Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, Zambia, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, face heightened risks of food inflation and declining crop yields.
The combined effect is a dual shock: export earnings weaken for producers, while import-dependent economies absorb rising costs and agricultural stress, amplifying macroeconomic and food security pressures.
Urea prices have surged from just under $500 per tonne before the conflict to above $700 per tonne in recent weeks. In South Africa, where roughly 80 per cent of crop production inputs are imported, and fertiliser constitutes a major share, grain farmers face input cost increases of up to 35 per cent. As Africa’s largest supplier of packaged foods, these pressures will likely transmit through the food system, worsening inflation.
Disruptions place disproportionate pressure on Africa’s low-industrialised farming systems. Fertiliser use remains far below global levels, averaging just 17 kg to 23 kg per hectare compared with a global average of 135 kg per hectare, reflecting persistent constraints on affordability and access. Reduced access to fertiliser is likely to lower application rates, with direct knock-on effects on crop yields and overall production across the growing season.
The stakes are particularly high given the central role of agriculture in African economies. The sector employs between 60 per cent and 70 per cent of the workforce, with rates exceeding 80 per cent in countries like Burundi, Malawi and Madagascar. However, it is dominated by smallholder farmers with limited capacity to absorb rising input costs or supply disruptions, making them acutely vulnerable to fertiliser shocks.
The lesson is not only about exposure tied to price volatility risks. It is also one of the structural vulnerabilities and untapped capacities. Africa holds many of the inputs required to reduce this dependency: natural gas reserves in Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania and Senegal; significant phosphate resources in Morocco and Tunisia; and rapidly growing demand driven by the need to boost agricultural productivity and contain food crises.
Converting this resource base into production and supply capacity is achievable, but requires focusing on three priorities.
First, production must be scaled strategically. Not every country needs to produce fertiliser, but a core group with comparative advantages could anchor regional supply. Second, markets must be integrated. Without efficient cross-border trade, lower transport costs and reliable distribution, increased production won’t translate into access. The African Continental Free Trade Area agreement provides a ready framework, but it must be operationalised.
Third, fertiliser policy must extend beyond production. Supply depends on functioning ecosystems: storage, blending, transport, finance and last-mile delivery. Without these, fertiliser will not reach farmers at scale. These segments create space for local entrepreneurship. The growth of agri-tech platforms such as Hello Tractor and Apollo Agriculture shows what’s possible, but these remain the exception, not the norm.
Self-sufficiency is neither feasible nor necessary. However, the current disruption exposes the cost of leaving a strategic input to external markets. Greater regional capacity would not eliminate global exposure, but would reduce the extent to which distant crises dictate African food systems.
The Hormuz shock is a warning about the fragility of supply chains. It exposes a persistent blind spot in agricultural policy debates. While financing gaps and farm-level productivity dominate the agenda, less attention is given to upstream supply chains that shape access to critical inputs such as fertiliser.
It’s a reminder that agricultural stability and food security depend not just on seeds, rainfall and land, but on whether Africa can build the industrial foundations that address the fertiliser system deficit and make food production less vulnerable to external dependencies.
A previous version of this article was published in Africa Tomorrow, the blog of the ISS African Futures and Innovation Programme.
Julia Baum, Website Consultant and Marvellous Ngundu, Research Consultant, Institute for Security Studies (ISS).
