Damascus, Syria – On 6 March, days after launching the war against Iran, US President Donald Trump stated he would approve of Iranian Kurds taking military action against the Iranian regime.
“I think it’s wonderful that they want to do that, I’d be all for it,” Trump said in an interview with news agency Reuters. As Washington sought to mobilise opposition against Tehran, it reportedly engaged in talks with Iranian-Kurdish factions.
However, at the peak of US and Israeli attacks on Iran, Kurdish factions – including the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) – ultimately remained on the sidelines. The PJAK is an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant group that fought for the creation of a Kurdish state for decades.
“If the PJAK had entered the war, Iran would have hit them very hard in the areas where they actually live and operate – that would have been an existential risk,” Erdem Ozan, a former Turkish ambassador who served in the Middle East, told The New Arab.
“For the PKK, staying out avoided opening a new front while they’re already stretched in Turkey, Iraq, and what’s left of their space in Syria.”
In Syria, the group established a foothold as the Assad regime largely withdrew from northeastern Syria in 2012. The Syrian branch of the PKK, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), took control of key Kurdish cities in northeastern Syria and eventually led the fight against the Islamic State (IS), starting with the battle of Kobani in 2014.
Then, in 2015, the group came under the umbrella of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which led a succession of battles against IS culminating in the group’s territorial defeat in 2019. Over the years, the PKK consolidated territorial control and gained a key foothold in Syria, something it was unable to achieve in other neighbouring countries.
However, in mid-February, high-profile fighters belonging to the PKK withdrew from Syria to the Qandil mountains on the Iraq-Iran border as part of a ceasefire deal between the SDF and the Syrian government.
The agreement came following weeks of clashes in Aleppo and eastern Syria that resulted in the withdrawal of the SDF to key urban strongholds in northern Syria.
“Dozens of members of the PKK, both Syrian and non-Syrian, blacklisted by Turkey, withdrew from Syrian territory,” a source involved in the negotiations between the SDF and Damascus told The New Arab.
The retreat of PKK fighters from Syria came amid a similar withdrawal from Turkey last October following a historic call last year by imprisoned PKK founder and leader Abdullah Ocalan for the group to disarm and dissolve itself.
The unilateral withdrawal last year came after the PKK announced an unconditional ceasefire in March 2025, reviving the long-stalled peace process with Turkey. The PKK had waged an insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984.
As the region remains in a state of flux, the PKK’s positioning in Syria and Iran raises important questions regarding the future of the group and the Kurdish cause more broadly.
Impacts on Syria
“The PKK and its associated actors within Syria have clearly lost substantial influence on the ground with the massive reduction in territory and important infrastructure under their control,” Thomas McGee, a research fellow at the European University Institute and specialist in Kurdish affairs, told TNA.
“This obviously comes with a huge loss of leverage and influence both with other Syrian actors and internationally.”
Over the course of last year, the SDF had made repeated calls for decentralisation and federalism, which were largely dismissed by Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa.
In January, Al-Sharaa issued a historic decree enshrining Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights. It also offered a pathway to citizenship for thousands of stateless Syrian Kurds. However, the decree fell short of political concessions for Kurdish autonomy.
“For Kurds in Syria, bargaining power diminishes sharply as territorial control and international backing erode – Damascus can now negotiate from a position of strength, offering limited decentralisation rather than meaningful autonomy,” says Ozan.
Under the 18 January agreement – reiterated under a subsequent 30 January agreement – the SDF agreed to integrate all civil and military institutions in Hasakeh province into state institutions, effectively bringing its governance project – the Autonomous Administration – to an end. Negotiations have stalled in recent months, failing to bring full integration to fruition.
In January, US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack said “the original purpose of the SDF as the primary anti-ISIS force on the ground has largely expired,” effectively withdrawing its support for its long-time ally.
Repercussions for Turkey
The effects of the PKK’s losses in Syria will also be felt across the border in Turkey. “Turkey’s involvement in Syria as an anti-Kurdish force spoils the relations inside Turkey as well,” says Nazan Bedirhanoglu, Professor at Xavier University and specialist on Kurdish affairs.
In January, the Turkish government cracked down on protests by Kurdish citizens denouncing advances by the Syrian army against the SDF.
In February, a Turkish parliamentary commission voted overwhelmingly in favour of a roadmap for democratic reforms that would include disarming and reintegrating PKK fighters into Turkish society. However, “the [Turkish] government has not taken any concrete steps such as releasing political prisoners, despite high expectations,” Bedirhanoglu told TNA.
“The Turkish state does not see this as a democratisation process but a disarmament process that could potentially help the current president in the next elections.”
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could attempt to appease Kurds in order to secure their votes for constitutional changes and remain in power. However, PKK officials recently criticised Ankara’s inaction despite the group’s unilateral confidence-building measures.
“Ankara will read the PKK’s losses [in Syria] as validation of its long-term pressure strategy, reinforcing a security‑first approach,” Ozan says.
Like his Syrian counterpart, Erdogan has denounced Kurdish calls for decentralisation and federalism in Syria, calling them “nothing more than a raw dream.” In Turkey, he has unilaterally dismissed Kurdish demands for recognition, saying “there is no Kurdish issue.”
Turkey could act as a spoiler and take military action against Kurdish forces, especially if progress on SDF-Damascus integration stalls. Over the weekend, four SDF brigades were incorporated into the military and deployed to Kobani, Hassakah, Qamishli, and Derik in northern Syria. However, Sipan Hamo, Deputy Defence Minister for the Eastern Region and an SDF leader, said that “the issue of cohesion still remains, and we have not yet reached a fully unified military body.”
Ankara “has strong incentives to continue or expand military operations while the PKK is weakened – security logic, domestic politics, and regional signalling all point in that direction,” Ozan says. Erdogan has previously threatened military action if the SDF does not disband.
Long-term implications
“The PKK is resilient, but the loss of its Syrian foothold forces a strategic contraction. It will shift from an expansive posture to a defensive one, prioritising survival,” Ozan says.
“When cornered, armed movements face incentives to escalate or fragment – the PKK may resort to higher‑impact attacks to signal relevance, while splinter elements could act unpredictably, often the most destabilising phase for civilians,” he added.
Noting previous attacks by PKK-affiliated groups in Afrin, McGee said that “if the reintegration agreement is not respected, we could see groups aligned with the PKK pushed underground and engaging in irregular warfare against those they consider to be occupiers”.
In 2018, the Kurdish-majority city and its surroundings came under the occupation of Turkish-aligned opposition groups after Ankara launched its so-called Operation Euphrates Shield.
“Formal dissolution is unlikely, movements like the PKK tend to mutate rather than disappear – what is more plausible is a gradual loss of centrality as other Kurdish actors gain weight,” Ozan adds.
“The Kurdish movement has faced other pushbacks in the past but survived because it has a long-term vision,” Bedirhanoglu says. “They have always employed a perspective of carrying on multifaceted forms of resistance rather than defeatism.”
“This moment signals the end of one path, not the end of Kurdish aspirations,” Ozan says.
Natacha Danon is a Damascus-based journalist with Syria Direct
Follow her on X: @natacha_danon
Edited by Charlie Hoyle
