A Legal Analysis of the Federal High Court Lokoja Ruling Setting Aside the NDC Registration Judgment: The Doctrine Invoked, the Reasoning Applied, the Precedents Cited, and the Five Fundamental Questions the Ruling Leaves Unanswered
The certified true copy of the ruling delivered by Justice Isa H. Dashen of the Federal High Court, Lokoja, on Friday, June 26, 2026, in Suit No. FHC/LKJ/CS/49/2025, setting aside the same court’s December 10, 2025, judgment that had directed INEC to register the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) as a political party, reveals a decision that rests on a specific doctrinal foundation the court’s inherent jurisdiction exercisable ex debito justitiae and a specific factual finding that a necessary party whose legal interests were directly affected was denied the constitutional right to fair hearing.
A close reading of the ruling, however, raises five fundamental questions about the legal reasoning, the procedural propriety, and the broader implications of the decision for Nigerian litigation practice.
What the Court Actually Ordered
The ruling granted the application of Barrister Emmanuel Uzowuru, described as the Pro Tem National Legal Adviser of the Peace Movement Party (PMP), who appeared “for himself and as representative of the Peace Movement Party.” The application was brought by Motion on Notice dated May 4, 2026, and filed May 5, 2026, pursuant to Order 26 Rules 1 and 8 and Rule 56 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2019 and the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
The court made five orders: granting the application; setting aside the December 10, 2025, judgment; reverting the suit to the stage it occupied immediately before the delivery of the set-aside judgment; granting parties liberty to take all necessary procedural steps for the determination of the substantive dispute; and making no order as to costs.
The application was supported by a 41-paragraph affidavit deposed to by Uzowuru, with Exhibits A through G. The NDC’s respondents filed a 54-paragraph counter-affidavit sworn to by one Kareem Henry, with Exhibit NDC “A.”
The Doctrinal Foundation: Inherent Jurisdiction and Ex Debito Justitiae
Justice Dashen grounded his ruling in the court’s inherent jurisdiction, which is the residual authority that every court of record possesses to do justice, to prevent abuse of its processes, and to ensure that its proceedings comply with fundamental principles of law.
The phrase “ex debito justitiae,” meaning “as a matter of right” or “as a debt of justice,” is a legal principle that holds that where a court’s proceedings are fundamentally flawed, the resulting judgment must be set aside as of right, not as a matter of discretion. It is typically invoked where a judgment is a nullity, for example because the court lacked jurisdiction, or because a party’s constitutional right to fair hearing was violated.
Justice Dashen held: “I further hold that the judgment delivered on 10th December 2025 was entered in proceedings conducted without the participation of a necessary party whose legal interests were directly affected and in circumstances amounting to a denial of the constitutional right to fair hearing. The said judgment is therefore liable to be set aside ex debito justitiae in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and prevent a miscarriage of justice.”
He cited Adigun v. Attorney-General of Oyo State and Pam v. Mohammed (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1112) 1 for the proposition that once a breach of fair hearing is established, the resultant proceedings are rendered a nullity irrespective of the apparent correctness of the decision reached therein.
Question One: Is the Court Functus Officio?
The most fundamental question the ruling raises is whether Justice Dashen’s court had jurisdiction to entertain the application at all.
The doctrine of functus officio provides that once a court delivers a final judgment on the merits of a case, it has exhausted its jurisdiction over the subject matter and cannot revisit, review, or set aside its own decision. The remedy for a party aggrieved by a final judgment is to appeal to a higher court, not to return to the same court and ask it to undo what it has done.
Justice Dashen’s ruling does not appear to directly address the functus officio objection, at least not in the extracted portions. Instead, he proceeded on the basis that the court’s inherent jurisdiction, exercisable ex debito justitiae, empowers it to set aside its own judgment where that judgment was delivered in breach of fair hearing.
The legal question is whether the inherent jurisdiction exception is broad enough to override the functus officio principle in circumstances where the applicant seeking to set aside the judgment was not a party to the original proceedings, is not a registered political party, applied to be registered as a political party over a decade ago and was denied, and has no current registration or participation in the political process.
Nigerian jurisprudence recognises narrow exceptions to the functus officio doctrine. A court can set aside its own judgment where the judgment is a nullity, for example because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. A court can also set aside its own judgment where it was obtained by fraud. The question is whether the denial of fair hearing to a third party who was not involved in the original proceedings constitutes a sufficient ground for the trial court itself, rather than the appellate court, to vacate its own final judgment.
Senior Advocates who have commented on the ruling have argued that the proper remedy for the PMP, if it believed its rights were affected, was to apply for leave to appeal as an interested party at the Court of Appeal, not to return to the same court that delivered the judgment. John Olusola Baiyeshea, SAN, stated that if a Federal High Court set aside a previous order by another judge of the same court, “that is abominably wrong.” While the Lokoja ruling involved the same judge setting aside his own earlier judgment rather than another judge’s, the functus officio principle applies with equal force to both scenarios once final judgment has been entered.
Question Two: Was the PMP a “Necessary Party”?
Justice Dashen’s ruling turns on his finding that the PMP was “a necessary party whose legal interests were directly affected” by the December 2025 judgment. This finding is the cornerstone of the fair hearing argument: if the PMP was not a necessary party, its absence from the original proceedings could not constitute a denial of fair hearing.
Under Nigerian law, a necessary party is one without whom the proceedings cannot be effectually and completely determined. The test is not whether a person might have an interest in the outcome, but whether the court cannot do complete justice between the existing parties without that person being present.
The PMP’s claimed interest is that the NDC was registered using a logo (the victory/peace sign) that the PMP had previously submitted to INEC as part of its own (unsuccessful) application for registration as a political party in 2015. The PMP was denied registration. It did not challenge the denial in court. It took no steps to pursue registration for approximately 10 years. It is not a registered political party. It does not sponsor candidates. It does not participate in political activities.
The question is whether an unregistered association that applied for registration over a decade ago, was denied, took no legal steps to challenge the denial, and has been dormant for 10 years can be classified as a “necessary party” to a later proceeding in which a different association successfully obtained a court order directing INEC to register it using a logo that the first association once proposed but was never granted.
NDC National Leader Seriake Dickson argued forcefully on Channels Television that the PMP is “unknown to the laws of Nigeria,” has no chairman, no secretary, no known members, no office, and no headquarters. He noted that the PMP’s sole representative before the court was someone described as a “pro tem national legal adviser,” not a trustee, chairman, or officer with clear authority to institute proceedings on behalf of the association.
The ruling does not address these objections in the extracted portions. The court simply found that the PMP had “a direct and legally recognisable interest” without, it appears, scrutinising whether an unregistered, dormant, decade-old association with a denied registration application possesses the kind of legal interest that makes it a necessary party whose absence renders proceedings a nullity.
Question Three: Was There Actually a Denial of Fair Hearing?
The fair hearing argument rests on the premise that the PMP was not afforded an opportunity to participate in proceedings whose outcome affected its interests. However, Dickson disclosed a critical fact that complicates this narrative: INEC itself raised the issue of the PMP’s prior application during the original December 2025 proceedings.
According to Dickson, INEC, which opposed the NDC’s application for registration, told the court that in 2015, an association had applied to use the same logo. Justice Dashen himself, during the original proceedings, asked INEC directly: were they registered? INEC said no. Were they seeking to be registered now, in the current exercise? INEC said no.
If these facts are accurate, and they have not been contradicted in the public domain, then the issue of the PMP’s prior application was not suppressed or concealed from the court. It was raised by INEC, examined by the judge, and found not to present a conflict. The court proceeded to grant the NDC’s registration on the basis that the PMP was not a registered political party, was not seeking registration, and had no subsisting claim to the symbol.
