The US and Iran have kept diplomacy alive, but neither side is ready to surrender its leverage
Recently, US President Donald Trump said he is satisfied with the situation regarding the Strait of Hormuz and the progress in negotiations with Iran. US Vice President J.D. Vance expressed similar sentiments earlier, noting that they succeeded in creating a mechanism to prevent further escalation between Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah, and laid the foundation for a future peace agreement during the talks in Switzerland.
At first glance, this looks like a diplomatic breakthrough, but the reality is more complex. The Trump administration’s optimistic rhetoric doesn’t change the fact that the negotiation process remains highly volatile, and trust between the parties is minimal or even nonexistent. Moreover, while Vance led the negotiations in Switzerland, Trump, in his characteristic manner, once again lashed out at Iran, effectively jeopardizing the efforts of his own negotiating team. As a result, the Iranian side has temporarily withdrawn from the negotiations, although the Trump administration is trying to downplay this episode.
Nevertheless, it’s premature to say the negotiations have failed. Subsequent statements by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi demonstrated that despite its irritation, Tehran is not interested in immediately disrupting the negotiation process. On the contrary, the Iranian side continues to leave room for diplomacy, while demonstrating that it is not prepared to make concessions under pressure and public threats.
Currently, a temporary negotiation framework is in effect – a sort of memorandum that could remain valid for another 50-60 days. This is not a full-fledged agreement, but merely a pause that each side is using to its own advantage. For the US, this is an opportunity to demonstrate that the crisis is manageable and to reduce risks regarding the Strait of Hormuz and the Lebanese front. For Iran, it is a way to buy time, reduce sanctions pressure, restore diplomatic maneuverability, and test the extent to which Washington is truly capable of controlling its own rhetoric and the actions of its allies.
This is precisely why the current situation cannot be described as either a success or a failure. It is an intermediate stage in which common ground remains, but there are no guarantees that the diplomatic process will remain active. Any sudden move, such as a new threat from Trump, Israel’s operation in Lebanon, an attack on regional infrastructure, or a harsh statement from Tehran, could quickly reduce these efforts to nothing.
Therefore, unconditional pessimism is as misguided as excessive optimism. The negotiations have not failed. The communication channel is functioning, the parties continue to exchange signals, and the timeframe offers a chance for further coordination. But this opportunity is rather limited and unstable. Iran, as always, is trying to win time and make the most of the diplomatic pause. The US is trying to portray the situation as a manageable process, even though it occasionally creates new risks on its own.
The situation with regard to the Strait of Hormuz also remains uncertain. Formally, the US and Iran have reportedly agreed to establish a communication line to ensure the safe passage of ships. Trump has hastened to declare that the strait is “fully open.” However, Iranian sources paint a completely different picture. According to them, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has not granted passage to any vessels. This means that even at the basic information level, the parties and their associated media channels are describing events differently.
This is precisely why there is no certainty regarding the strait. American political rhetoric, the demonstrations of control by Iran, and market signals all tell a different story. The overall picture is neither transparent nor stable. Formally, it may look like de-escalation, but in practice, it resembles a regime of managed uncertainty in which each side retains the ability to interpret events to its own advantage.
The reaction of the oil markets should not mislead anyone. The fact that Brent is currently hovering around $78-$80 per barrel looks good for Washington: An extreme price shock has been avoided for now, as markets appear to have partially accepted the possibility of stabilization. But this doesn’t mean the crisis is over. The oil market reacts not only to facts but also to expectations. If there is a new military incident, an attack on a ship or its blockage, or a tough statement from one of the parties, prices could once again surge to $100 per barrel. In this case, the current stabilization will prove to be a temporary pause rather than a sign of a real settlement.
In this sense, Iran-US relations are currently in a kind of gray zone. There is no direct confrontation between the parties, but no lasting diplomatic settlement has been achieved either. The parties preserve the negotiation channel, but are not demonstrating sufficient trust for reaching a sustainable agreement. The US is trying to demonstrate that it is in control of the situation and is capable of ensuring freedom of navigation. Iran, on the contrary, emphasizes that the strait remains its most important lever of pressure and that any agreements will be implemented only under conditions deemed acceptable by Tehran.
This is precisely why the situation cannot be assessed in a definitive manner. On the one hand, the existence of a communication channel and a negotiation framework reduces the risk of accidental escalation. On the other, the absence of clear rules, as well as contradictory statements and ongoing military pressure make the situation extremely volatile. This is not a diplomatic failure – but it’s not a true success either. Rather, it is a temporary pause; the parties are trying to buy time, test each other’s intentions, and prevent immediate failure.
The main conclusion is that the Strait of Hormuz has become not just a transportation corridor, but an indicator of the US-Iran dynamic. As long as there is uncertainty with it, the entire negotiation framework remains unstable. The sides can declare that the situation is under control, but in reality, a single incident, political statement, or misinterpreted action at sea can change everything. Therefore, it’s too early to talk about full-fledged de-escalation. The term ‘gray zone’ is more relevant: While room for agreement remains, there is also the risk of a new escalation.
There’s no talk of a breakthrough, but a diplomatic window remains open, though it may be closed at any moment. The future of the negotiations will depend on whether the parties can maintain balance when it comes to real political concessions. The problem is that this balance is currently more rhetorical than practical. The US and Iran apparently hear each other better, but this doesn’t mean they are ready to really listen. Earlier, the two sides largely failed to hear each other’s signals; now the situation has somewhat changed. But understanding the other party’s position doesn’t equate to a willingness to take it into account when making a political decision. The US wants to present the process as progress toward a lasting deal, but continues to speak to Iran in the language of threats and public pressure. Iran, for its part, is willing to remain in the negotiation process, but is reluctant to make commitments that may look like forced concessions.
Furthermore, the Israeli factor cannot be eliminated. An Iran-US agreement will not exist in a vacuum, but in a regional environment where Israel remains an independent player with its own interests, threats, and red lines. Factors like Lebanon and Hezbollah, the security of Israel’s northern borders, and Iran’s influence on regional armed movements will all directly or indirectly influence the negotiations. Even if Washington and Tehran formally agree on the de-escalation parameters, it is unclear whether the negotiation process can remain free of external pressure.
A separate issue that has not disappeared from the agenda is Iran’s nuclear program. Formally, Iran can still claim that its nuclear activities are peaceful. But the context has changed. Prior to February 28, there were no significant or active discussions in Iran about moving toward creating a nuclear bomb, but now these discussions have become a reality. One can’t simply remove it from the agenda or pretend that nothing has happened.
Washington will now have to deal not only with the technical parameters of Iran’s nuclear program, but also with the new political atmosphere in Iran. Following recent military pressure, the arguments of Iranian officials who favor a more hardline stance have gained additional traction. This poses a difficult question for the US: How can it restrict Iran’s nuclear program without strengthening the forces within Iran that believe making concessions to the West is dangerous and pointless?
All of this makes the current situation ambiguous. The negotiations have not failed and there is still room for compromise; but a full-fledged breakthrough is impossible. Too many factors currently prevent the parties from reaching a lasting agreement. While the chance of reaching an agreement remains, it will not depend on rhetorical statements, but on the ability of the US and Iran to move from demonstrative signals to real political concessions.
