Imagine you pay for a hotel room with an ocean view. You arrive, and the manager says, with a straight face, that the ocean was too difficult to build next to, so he has given you a lovely view of the car park. Then he tells you the price has not changed.
That is the image that came to mind when I heard David Umahi announce that Tinubu had ordered the Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway rerouted through the existing East-West Road in parts of the Ondo-to-Edo corridor.
The instruction, according to him, was to avoid constructing a new alignment along the affected corridor. Difficult terrain, rising costs and flooding were among the reasons offered.
I find this remarkable. A project sold as a transformative highway is now being redirected onto an existing road because building the original route has become too difficult or expensive.
And Umahi reportedly considers the President’s approval of the diversion the best day of his life. Really?
If this is the best day of the minister’s life, I can only wonder what the preceding years have been like. More importantly, why should Nigerians celebrate a decision that raises serious questions about the planning of a project they are financing?
I remember the original sales pitch. The Lagos-Calabar Coastal Highway was presented as a roughly 700-kilometre economic corridor that would transform coastal communities, stimulate investment and become one of Tinubu’s defining legacies.
Critics who questioned its cost, priority and procurement were dismissed or ridiculed. Peter Obi argued that Nigeria should prioritise its crumbling existing roads. Rotimi Amaechi also advocated fixing the East-West Road. The government’s response was to defend its grand vision.
Now the East-West Road has become part of the solution.
Umahi says the original alignment encountered deep peat, difficult subsoil, pits and other engineering challenges. He has also cited flooding and the need to raise sections of the existing road. These are legitimate engineering considerations. A government should not build an expensive road through unsuitable terrain merely to protect its political pride.
But surely the purpose of feasibility studies and geotechnical surveys is to identify such obstacles before construction begins.
What did the original investigations reveal? What did the ministry know before approving the route? What did the contractor discover that the government’s preliminary studies had missed? And who bears the financial consequences of those decisions?
The Federal Government has described the realignments as necessary engineering interventions designed to improve safety, durability and cost-effectiveness.
Fine. Then publish the original and revised engineering reports. Show us the evidence that the changes were unavoidable and explain what they mean for the contract price.
Engineering is dynamic. Public accountability should not be optional.
The procurement arrangement remains another uncomfortable part of this story.
Hitech Construction Company, associated with the Chagoury Group, received the contract for the initial Lagos section without an open competitive tender. Umahi defended the choice by pointing to the company’s track record and said the procurement process had passed through the Bureau of Public Procurement and the Federal Executive Council.
Those approvals matter. They should be examined rather than dismissed. But they do not make questions about competition and value for money disappear.
Gilbert Chagoury has a longstanding relationship with Tinubu. That relationship alone does not establish corruption. Yet when a company associated with a longstanding presidential associate receives a contract of this magnitude without open competition, transparency becomes imperative.
Umahi has said Tinubu never instructed him to award the contract to Hitech. He has also cited the company’s previous work in Lagos during Tinubu’s governorship in defending the selection.
I want to see the comparative evidence. Where are the competing bids, the technical evaluations and the price comparisons demonstrating that Hitech offered the best value? Where is the complete BPP paper trail explaining why the procurement method was appropriate?
A contractor’s experience is relevant. It is not a substitute for a transparent process.
If the award was proper, the records should settle the matter. If they cannot, the government has a bigger problem than hostile commentary.
The project has been discussed as a roughly ₦15 trillion undertaking. The initial 47-kilometre Lagos section was put at approximately ₦1.06 trillion in figures cited during the procurement controversy.
At that price, Nigerians are entitled to demand more than assurances about the quality of the concrete.
The financing story has also evolved. Umahi initially described a structure under which the Federal Government would contribute between 15 and 30 per cent, with the balance expected from external financing. He subsequently described the arrangement as a 30 per cent government contribution and 70 per cent financing from external lenders.
The government says the financing arrangement has attracted lenders and undergone financial scrutiny. That is relevant, but it does not replace public disclosure of the obligations Nigeria is assuming.
How much has actually been paid? How much work has been independently certified? What are the financing costs and repayment terms? What sums have been appropriated and released? What happens to the original contract value when an alignment is abandoned or the scope changes?
A route change does not automatically reduce the cost. Raising an existing road, improving drainage and strengthening weak foundations can be expensive. But that is precisely why the government must publish revised quantities, variation orders and cost estimates.
I want to know what Nigerians are paying for, not merely what officials say they are building.
There is another issue I cannot ignore. The government’s political investment in this highway has often seemed greater than its appetite for answering difficult questions.
The environmental assessment question is a good example. Official records show that draft Environmental and Social Impact Assessments for the first two Lagos sections were placed on public display in 2024.
So, the honest question is not simply whether an assessment existed. It is whether the relevant assessments were completed, whether the findings informed the original route and whether the government acted on them before committing public money.
That is the standard I would apply to every major decision on this project.
I want the original surveys, the procurement approvals, the financing agreements, the payment records and every significant variation order.
