A member of the Global Legal Consortium for Nnamdi Kanu, Christopher Chidera, has said Nigeria’s judiciary will face serious questions when Kanu’s appeal against his conviction is eventually listed and heard.
Kanu was convicted in 2025 on terrorism-related charges and is serving a life sentence in Sokoto.
He has appealed to quash the conviction but the case has not been heard, a development his camp has continued to lament.
A consortium of lawyers, who represent the IPOB leaders, on Saturday questioned the basis upon which he was convicted.
The consortium lead Chidera questioned the legal basis the court relied on to convict Kanu on November 20, 2025, arguing that the judge relied on a repealed terrorism law to support the conviction.
He said the central question was: “Under which constitutionally cognisable law did Justice James Omotosho convict Mazi Nnamdi Kanu on 20 November 2025?”
According to him, the issue revolves around the distinction between Sections 36(8) and 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution, which he said address different legal questions.
Chidera argued that while Section 36(8) concerns the law applicable to conduct at the time an alleged offence was committed, Section 36(12) concerns the written law defining the offence and prescribing its punishment at the time of conviction.
“There are two constitutional questions. They are different. They are not interchangeable,” he told the consortium on Saturday as they brainstorm on when the case would be heard.
“Section 36(8) asks: What law governed the conduct when it happened? Section 36(12) asks: What written law defines the offence and prescribes the penalty now — at the moment of conviction?”
Chidera alleged that Justice Omotosho answered the conviction-stage question under Section 36(12) by relying on the provision dealing with the law applicable when the conduct occurred.
“Omotosho answered the second with the first. He reached into the past for the law that governed the conduct and used it to justify a conviction happening in the present,” he said.
The lawyer further argued that the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011, as amended in 2013, on which the charges were based, had been repealed by Section 98(1) of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022.
“The Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011, as amended in 2013 – the TPAA – was the statute the charges were built on,” he said.
“Section 98(1) of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 repealed it.”
Chidera maintained that the repeal meant the former legislation was no longer in force and therefore could not, in his interpretation, constitute the written law required under Section 36(12) to sustain a conviction pronounced in 2025.
He cited Section 36(12), which provides that a person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is defined and its penalty prescribed in a written law.
According to him, the provision requires the court to identify the law capable of supporting the conviction at the time the conviction is entered.
“So the only question on 20 November 2025 was this: what law that is alive today defines this offence and fixes this penalty?” he said.
“Not what law governed 2018, 2019 or 2020. What law supports the conviction the moment it is pronounced?”
The lawyer also relied on Section 315(4)(b) of the Constitution, arguing that the provision defines “existing law” by reference to an enactment that “is in force.”
Chidera said Sections 36(12) and 315(4)(b), when read together, meant that a repealed statute could not serve as the written law supporting a conviction.
“The historical fact that the TPAA was once written law does not make it written law in force on 20 November 2025,” he said.
He also rejected the argument that the saving provisions of the 2022 Act could revive the repealed legislation.
“Section 98(3) can preserve a proceeding. It can preserve a liability. It cannot resurrect the dead statute,” Chidera said.
“There is a fatal difference between a legal consequence surviving a repeal and the repealed law coming back to life. The first is possible. The second is not.”
Chidera further argued that Sections 97 and 98(2) of the 2022 Act provided a legal pathway for existing proceedings following the repeal of the earlier legislation.
He said the process involved the repeal of the old law, preservation of qualifying proceedings and liabilities, and movement to the corresponding provisions of the 2022 legislation.
“The judge did not have to invent anything. He had only to follow the road the National Assembly had already paved,” he stated during his presentation.
He described the alleged reliance on the repealed law as the central flaw in Justice Omotosho’s judgment.
According to Chidera, the distinction between the law governing conduct when an alleged offence occurred and the law capable of constitutionally supporting a conviction was fundamental.
“Governing conduct in the past is one thing. Supplying the constitutional basis for a conviction today is another,” he said.
He maintained that the alleged error was not merely a wrong citation or typographical mistake but went to the foundation of the conviction.
“This is not a wrong citation. It is not a typo in the margin. It is not a judge reaching the right place by the wrong road,” he said.
“It is the wrong provision answering the wrong question.”
Chidera consequently argued that where the constitutional requirement for a conviction was absent, the resulting conviction would be a nullity.
“The Constitution required an existing law. The TPAA was not one. The 2022 Act was,” he said.
